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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jessica Halbesleben appeals from her convictions on two counts of felony 
injury to a child, asserting that the state breached the plea agreement by making 
a sentencing argument which impliedly disavowed its recommendation. 
Appellant also asserts that her sentence of 10 years with the first 3 years fixed on 
each count to run consecutive, for a total sentence of 20 years with the first 6 
years fixed, was excessive, and that the district court erred in denying her I.C.R. 
35 motion 
Statement of Facts 
While some more detail will be provided below, generally speaking, the 
facts as provided in the indictment for the two counts of which Ms. Halbesleben 
was convicted are as follows: 
COUNT l 
That the defendants, THOMAS AND JESSICA HALBESLEBEN, on 
or between October 2002 and February 25, 2005, in the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, did, under circumstances likely to cause great 
bodily harm, commit an injury upon a child under eighteen years of 
age, to-wit:  of the ages of 2, 3, and 4, by unlawfully and 
willfully causing or permitting the child to be placed in a situation 
endangering her health or person, while having care and/or custody 
of the child, by allowing unsu sed contact with her older 
brothers: age 10 to 12 and age 8 to 10, who they knew 
had sexually penetrated Autumn's body on multiple occasions. 
COUNT I1 
That the defendants, THOMAS AND JESSICA HALBESLEBEN, on 
or between October 2002 and February 25, 2005, in the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, did, under circumstances likely to cause great 
bodily harm, commit an injury upon a child under eighteen years of 
age, to-wit: of the ages of 7 1/2 months to 2 years, by 
unlawfully and willfully causing or permitting the child to be placed 
in a situation endangering her health or person, while having care 
andlor custody of t , by allowing uns ised contact with 
her older brothers: ge 10 to 12 and ge 8 to 10, who 
they knew had sexually penetrated ody on multiple 
occasions. 
Indictment, p. 1-2. (R. p. 6-7.) 
Course of Proceedinqs 
On May 4, 2005, a grand jury indictment was filed charging Ms. 
Halbesleben and her husband at the time, Thomas Halbesleben, with four counts 
of felony Injury to a Child, contrary to I.C. section 18-1501(1). (R. p. 6-8.) Ms. 
Halbesleben brought a motion to dismiss indictment which was denied by the 
district court. (R. p. 21-31; 79-83.) 
Then, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ms. Halbesleben pled guilty 
to two counts of felony injury to a child and the other two counts were dismissed, 
as was a separate misdemeanor charge of failure to report sex abuse. (R. p. 93.) 
The material terms of the plea agreement, which was not binding on the court, 
provided that the state would recommend sentences of one year fixed followed 
by nine years indeterminate on each count to run consecutive but that the 
defense would request a lesser sentence. (R. p. 93-94.) Also, the agreement 
specifically provided that the parties intended that the defendant serve no more 
than two years before becoming parole eligible, and if the ldaho Department of 
Corrections interpreted the sentence in a different manner, then the defendant 
would have the right to a new sentencing. (R. p. 94.) At a change of plea 
hearing, the court accepted the guilty plea. (R. p. 97.) 
At the sentencing occurring on May 4, 2006, the district court sentenced 
Ms. Halbesleben to three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate on 
each count, to run consecutive, or in other words, a total sentence of twenty 
years with the first six years fixed. (R. p. 116.) No appeal was filed from the 
judgment of conviction. 
On August 31, 2006, Ms. Halbesleben brought, though counsel, a Rule 35 
motion seeking a reduction of her sentence, which the district court denied. (R. p. 
118-129; 130-134.) Appellant timely appealed from the denial of her Rule 35 
motion. (R. p. 135-137.) That appeal was assigned docket no. 33578. 
While this appeal was pending but before Appellant's brief was filed, Ms. 
Halbesleben filed a petition for post conviction relief alleging, infer alia, that her 
attorney did not file the requested appeal from her sentence. The district court 
ultimately granted relief on that issue and reentered the judgment, from which a 
timely notice of appeal was filed. (R. 35037, p. 11-13.') This appeal was 
assigned docket number 35037 and the two appeals were conso~idated.~ 
Except where indicated, all citations are to the record in docket no. 33578 
  he appeal of the denial of Ms. Halbesleben's other claims for post conviction 
relief was assigned docket no. 35029 and was consolidated as well. However, 
Appellant is contemporaneously herewith moving to sever that case from Docket 
nos. 33578 and 35037. 
ISSUES 
I .  Whether Ms. Halbesleben is entitled to withdraw her guilty plea 
because the state breached the plea agreement by impliedly 
disavowing the recommendation it was required to make. 
11. Whether the district court erred by imposing an excessive sentence 
andlor by denying the I.C.R. rule 35 motion for sentence reduction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
MS. HALBESLEBEN IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY PLEA 
BECAUSE THE STATE BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY IMPLIEDLY 
DISAVOWING THE RECOMMENDATION IT WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE 
In this case, the terms of the written non-binding plea agreement provided 
that the state would recommend sentences of one year fixed followed by nine 
years indeterminate on each count to run consecutive but that the defense 
would request a lesser sentence. (R. p. 93-94.) As will be explained at length 
below, Appellant asserts that the state breached the plea agreement because 
while it did remember as an afterthought to make that recommendation at 
sentencing, the state's entire argument effectively renounced the imposition of 
that relatively lenient sentence 
First, as a threshold matter, while Ms. Halbesleben did not object below, it 
is well established that the breach of a plea agreement is fundamental error 
which may be raised for the first time on appeal. As explained by the ldaho 
Court ofAppeals in State v. Jones, 139 ldaho 299, 77 P.3d 988 (Ct.App. 2003): 
Jones did not object to the prosecutor's statements at sentencing 
nor later file a motion for relief in the trial court. Ordinarily, this 
Court will not address an issue that was not initially presented to 
the trial court. Nevertheless, because a breach of a plea agreement 
is fundamental error, a claim of such a breach may be considered 
for the first time on appeal if the record provided is sufficient for that 
purpose. 
Id., p. 301 (internal citations omitted). 
In our case, the record is sufficient since the plea agreement was written 
and is part of our record, as is the prosecutor's later arguments at sentencing.3 
As to the merits of the issue regarding the breach of a plea agreement, 
Jones explained as follows: 
It is well established that "when a plea rests in any significant 
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can 
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise 
must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 
S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). This principle is 
derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule 
that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent. 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47, 
81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442-43 (1984); If the prosecution has breached its 
promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was 
intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea 
was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead 
guilty on a false premise. In such event, the defendant will be 
entitled to relief. Sanfobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 
L.Ed.2d at 433; Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508-09, 104 S.Ct. at 2546-47, 
81 L.Ed.2d at 442-43; As a remedy, the court may order specific 
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to 
withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 
499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433; . . . . 
The prosecution's obligation to recommend a sentence promised in 
a plea agreement does not carry with it the obligation to make the 
recommendation enthusiastically. A prosecutor may not circumvent 
a plea agreement, however, through words or actions that convey a 
reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may a 
prosecutor impliedly disavow the recommendation as something 
which the prosecutor no longer supports. Although prosecutors 
need not use any particular form of expression in recommending an 
agreed sentence, "their overall conduct must be reasonably 
consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the 
reverse." 
Id., p. 301-302 (internal citations omitted). 
Also, the breach of plea issue is properly raised in this appeal from the 
reentered judgment since it could have been raised in an original appeal from 
the judgment (had it been filed), because said issue arises out of sentencing 
and can be pursued despite the entry of an unconditional plea of guilty. 
6 
The state's recommendation at the sentencing appears below, and while it 
is lengthy, that is a large part of the point. The prosecutor argued as follows: 
In the last ten years, there has not been a worse case of child 
abuse in this county than what this defendant managed to 
accomplish in 13 years. 
From the minute she began having children, these babies were at 
risk. None of these children ever had a chance because they were 
born to the defendant and her husband. 
Their first daughter and son were removed from-from their care by 
the state of Georgia for maltreatment. Little Victoria was without her 
mother and father only at the age of 2. Travis was barely 1. After 
five months of being cared for by strangers, Victoria and Travis 
were returned, and the defendant and her codefendant moved to 
Idaho where they began having a baby every year-babies they 
had no business having because they had no foreseeable ability to 
financially care or support them and no ability to emotionally 
support, nurture, encourage, discipline or parent them. 
The system failed these children only because the system is set up 
to only be able to respond when it is dealing with children who are 
not brainwashed and trained by their parents not to talk to anyone, 
especially police or social workers. "Keep it in the family, or they will 
be taken away forever." 
By the time she caused-by the time her husband had caused a 4- 
inch gash to her 4-year old's head and she takes him to the 
emergent [sic] care center, she had had five children. These 
children had been to foster care twice. The second time, they were 
removed due to neglect and maltreatment. Travis, at age 5, was 
molested by a boy in his foster home. The babies the defendant 
allowed her older children to molest and rape for the last four years 
were not even born yet. 
She is the one who took little Jimmy, age 4, to the emergent [sic] 
care facility where the doctor called the police. All of those 
children-all five-were, again, placed into foster care for the third 
time. Social workers had to keep moving Jimmy because he was so 
destructive at the age of 4. He was evaluated by Dr. Woody, clinical 
psychiatrist, who determined that, at the age of 4, he had post- 
traumatic stress and was classified as severely, emotionally 
disturbed. He was also prescribed a healthy dose of antipsychotic 
meds and antidepressants. 
Bothsparents told the Department of Heath and Welfare that Jimmy 
caused all of the problems. And it was the Department's belief, at 
that time, that Jimmy was what we call a "target child." Both the 
defendant and her codefendant voluntary terminated on Jimmy, 
and they walked away from him. 
They neglected and abused and maltreated these children to the 
point that they are saddened and burdened with significant and 
diagnosable psychological problems, medical problems, intellectual 
development problem. And then, they walk away from Jimmy. They 
just wash their hands of him, at age 4. That's the age you still 
believe in Santa Claus. And the thought of your parents 
abandoning you and leaving you doesn't even enter onto the radar. 
Instead of working a plan to get her son back in her arms, she left 
him behind. 
Jimmy's siblings-they don't remember him, really. They know that 
when the police saw his injury, he kind of disappeared, and their 
parents didn't care and let him disappear. They didn't fight for him. I 
don't know where Jimmy is today, but I can only imagine what he is 
at the age of 11, being psychotic at the age of 4, as a result of what 
he survived. 
Every single one of these children is delayed and has major 
intellectual deficiencies. There is no proof in this record that they 
were born that way. You have page after page of school records 
from all of the professionals who encountered these children from 
the Boise to the Meridian School Districts. 
If these children were born with some cognitive deficit or delay, 
certainly a routine and nurturing and stimulation would have 
bettered their outcomes. it's almost a worse situation if it's alleged 
later by counsel that somehow they were just born like this. 
After the defendant's-after her picture appeared on the news 
when she was finally arrested, I got a cold call from a woman by the 
name of Lynda Mehrens who was almost in tears. And she was the 
preschooler teacher for Victoria and Travis when they were only 3 
and 4 years of age, and they were in desperate need of interaction, 
nurturing, stimulation, and routine. 
You could count the days the defendant managed to get these 
children to school on one hand. She documented the bruises, the 
dirty clothes, the hunger, the soreness from being thrown in a 
closet or door. It's all there, and she says to me, "I knew someday 
something was going to happen, and I saved this file on these two 
children." She kept her own personal file because she knew she 
could not get any help for them. 
She writes, "These two children, Travis and Victoria Halbesleben, 
were the worst abuse and neglect cases I have ever dealt with in 
my 30 years of teaching young special needs children." This 
woman tried to get action until the family decided to quote, "get 
Health and Welfare off their back by moving to Council with her 
codefendant's parents." Those are her words. 
The defendant, then, moved back to Boise, eventually, when 
Victoria was only 6, and that's when her codefendant husband first 
began to sexually molest her in her own bed. There was never 
enough food in this house. There was no dental care. And the 
reports kept being made by concerned citizens and neighbors but 
mostly by teachers or contacts the children had at school. 
In an effort to insolate the problems, she chose to slowly remove 
the children from the school system and claimed to be home 
schooling them with a computer that was broken for a long, long 
time, actually, that was provided to her. They spent their times idly 
watching television, doing chores, or being just essentially locked 
away in their rooms. 
At this time, Travis in not only molesting the babies, but he had 
repeatedly raped his younger brother, Jacob, whose then becomes 
a molester to the babies, as well. And you see in the reports that 
the District personally met with her and her husband over and over 
documenting their concerns that Travis was home schooled. Not 
because of the risk he posed to the babies but because he had 
made progress in the school, and they didn't want to slow down 
that momentum. They had seen improve [sic] with his behavior and 
his cognitive abilities, and they believed him to be-removing him 
from this social setting was going to be a major setback. 
Nevertheless, she removed him. 
And now, we know, ultimately, he had more access to the babies 
during the day while she is smoking meth in the garage in a home 
where there is very little food. She has to go and rely on charitable 
organizations to give her food, and yet, she has money for meth. 
Never understood that. Eight starving children, and she is smoking 
a bowl of meth when they should be eating a bowl of food. 
By this time, the defendant's husband is now having full intercourse 
to ejaculation with his older daughter who is now pretty much doing 
the best that she can to live this Cinderella life that her own mother 
thrusts upon her. She did the cooking with what little bit of supplies 
she had. She did the cleaning, which was an overwhelming task for 
any person, adult, let alone a young girl who is trying to go to junior 
high. 
And then, she was responsible for going to bed with the babies until 
her parents told her to go ahead and go to bed so her brothers 
can't molest the babies, which is the worst part of this case and 
what this case was ultimately brought into this courtroom. 
Imagine, if you will, knowing that what pathetic efforts you claim to 
make to protect an infant toddler and preschooler from their over- 
sexualized, highly sexualized, molesting brothers that those efforts 
don't work, and you don't do anything about it. How cruel it is for 
the defendant to fail to help her sons stop molesting, knowing that 
those boys-those two boys are going to carry that-what they did 
to their own siblings-for the rest of their lives. 
We have eight children now who are orphans because of her 
crimes. Her contribution in the world is making eight wards of the 
state for the next 16 years. 
So, not only do we get to pay financially, but the hours these social 
workers and foster parents and teachers will spending driving them 
and encouraging them though counseling and school and 
comforting them like the night when their parents who were 
supposed to be there for them weren't, reassuring them there is 
enough to eat and constantly trying to bolster their self-esteem. 
Those costs and harm that she caused are truly incalculable. And 
these are children that came from her flesh-that she carried all 
eight of these babies. 
The magnitude of the harm this defendant has caused by her 
crimes I try not to think about, but it's haunting. We need to be 
protected, obviously, from this defendant, but I think the most 
significant piece of this case for this defendant is that anything less 
than what the state recommends-and we encourage you to follow 
our recommendation-would depreciate the seriousness of what she 
has done over a long period of time. 
This didn't happen overnight. This didn't happen because she is 
poor. We live in a county where our children's hospital are like 
palaces. We have resources available or food and free dental 
care and all of those things. And she sat in the garage and smoked 
meth. 
Anything less than 1 year fixed followed by 9 indeterminate for 10, 
consecutive to 1 plus nine for 10, would depreciate the seriousness 
of what she did. We are not requesting restitution in this case 
because I can't even begin to calculate, and I don't think she has 
the means to ever pay. 
Tr. 5/3/06, p. 2, In. 16-p. 10, In. 5. 
Incidentally, defense counsel below disagreed with various assertions and 
characterizations by the state, but they will not be detailed here because what 
actually happened is not the point. Instead, the issue is whether or not the 
state's argument constitutes a violation of the plea agreement. 
Appellant asserts that it is. The prosecutor paid only lip service to the plea 
agreement by adding, in what appears to be a barely remembered afterthought, 
a recommendation of 10 years with 1 year fixed on each count to run 
consecutive. However, the prosecutor's vigorous argument was fundamentally 
at odds with such a recommendation. 
Our case is similar to several of those of the ldaho Court of Appeals 
holding that the state breached the plea agreement by its recommendation at 
sentencing. For example in State v. Daubs, 140 ldaho 299, 92 P.3d 549 
(Ct.App. 2004), the Court of Appeals explained as follows: 
The state argues that Daubs did not face the sort of egregious 
disregard of a plea agreement that Lankford criticizes. However, 
disregard of a plea agreement can be made manifest in more than 
one way. Here, the prosecution stated: 
Your honor, I have spoken with [the prosecutor assigned to 
the case], and the State has agreed to recommend no more 
than a Rider in this case. 
The PSI investigator, however, clearly is recommending 
prison based on the nature of Mr. Daub's crimes, his prior 
record, and his substance abuse problems. 
Rather than having me restate the information presented to 
the Court in the PSI and in the letters from the victims, I 
would ask that this Court hear from [the victim's parents], 
who are here. They're better able than I am to explain the 
horrific consequences that this crime has had on them, their 
daughters, and their entire family. 
This language, when taken in context of the entire proceeding, is 
clearly fundamentally at odds with the terms of the plea agreement. 
. . . . We conclude that the statements and evidence given to the 
sentencing judge amount to an abrogation of the plea agreement, 
and a tacit adoption of a recommendation altogether different than 
the one for which the state and defendant had bargained. 
Id. p. 301 
I 
In State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 102 P.3d 380 (Ct.App. 2004), the Court 
of Appeals rejected the state's contention that the prosecutor's argument was 
I 
necessary to rebut the defendant's request for a more lenient sentence. The 
I Court of Appeals stated, referring back to Jones, supra: 
I 
Although the prosecutor [in Jones] uttered the required 
recommendation, we concluded that her other statements 
effectively renounced that recommendation. Similarly, here, the 
prosecutor articulated the sentences the state agreed to 
I recommend, while presenting vigorous argument that was 
inconsistent with that recommendation. 
Wills, p. 775-776. 
Our case is also like Wills in that compared to the sentence that Ms. 
Halbesleben could have received (as well as what she actually received), the 
state's recommendation of basically two years fixed was relatively lenient. But, 
similar to what the Court of Appeals stated in Wills, "...as in Lankford, the 
prosecutor's arguments, taken as a whole, were not reasonably consistent with 
the lenient sentences that the state was obligated to recommend." Id., p. 776. 
Appellant asserts that no more need to be said on this issue because the 
prosecutor said it all. In short, the state breached the plea agreement when it 
paid only mild lip service to the recommendation which it agreed to make and 
instead made the lengthy argument detailed above which was totally at odds 
with its recommendation. Even if the state felt compelled to advocate for the 
recommended sentence in order to rebut the defense's argument for a more 
lenient one, the argument actually was in a word, overkill. The prosecutor's 
argument far exceeded anything even remotely necessary to ensure that Ms. 
Halbesleben would serve a penitentiary sentence given the circumstances of the 
case. 
The breach is clear, and as explained above, it results in a plea which was 
not voluntary and intelligent and is also a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the United State Constitution. Since Ms. Halbesleben was denied the benefit of 
her bargain, as mentioned above, two remedies are available, to wit, specific 
performance or withdrawal of the plea agreement. First and foremost, 
Appellant requests that she be allowed to withdraw her guilty pleas, but 
alternatively requests resentencing by a different judge. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING AN EXCESSIVE 
SENTENCE AND/OR BY DENYING THE I.C.R. 35 MOTION FOR 
SENTENCE REDUCTION 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Halbesleben asserts that the district court imposed an excessive total 
sentence when it ran her two sentences consecutive to another which resulted in 
a sentence of 20 years with the first 6 years fixed. Ms. Halbesleben also 
asserts that the district court erred in denying her I.C.R. Rule 35 motion. 
Appellant will point out that these issues are very closely related. In fact, 
the sentencing considerations were more clearly discussed in writing in the Rule 
35 motion and the denial thereof, and so Appellant will refer to them below 
instead of the sentencing itself, although the information is relevant to both 
issues. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard for reviewing a sentence is well established. In State v. 
Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 939 P.2d 1372 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
. . . '[wlhere a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has 
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence.' State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 
602 P.2d 71, 75 (1979). In determining whether the sentencing 
court abused its discretion, we review all the facts and 
circumstances of the case. State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 
143, 814 P.2d 401, 403 (1991). In order to show an abuse of 
discretion, the defendant must show that in light of the governing 
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the 
facts. Id. at 145, 814 P.2d at 405. The governing criteria, or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: ( 3 )  protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. (quoting Sfafe v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 
P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). 
Jackson, p. 295 
The standards for reviewing the denial of an I.C.R. Rule 35 motion have 
recently been comprehensively explained by the Supreme Court in State v. 
Adair, 145 ldaho 514, 181 P.3d 440 (2008): 
A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence applies to three different 
situations. It provides a procedure for (1) correction of an illegal 
sentence, (2) correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, and (3) authorizing the court to reduce a lawful sentence 
that, after further examination, is unduly harsh. "[A1 motion to 
reduce a legal sentence imposed in a legal manner is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the district court." A court does not abuse its 
discretion if (1) the court recognizes the decision as one of 
discretion, (2) the court acts within the bounds of that discretion and 
applies appropriate legal standards, and (3) the court reaches the 
decision through an exercise of reason. 
The defendant has the burden of showing that a sentence is 
excessive if the sentence is within the statutory limits. "A sentence 
is excessive if it is unreasonable under any rational view of the 
facts." A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is a plea for 
leniency. If the original sentence is not excessive, then the 
defendant must show at the trial court level that additional facts or 
information make the sentence excessive in light of that additional 
information. "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot 
be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new information." Sfafe v. Huffman, 144 ldaho 201, 
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
Id. 181 P.3d, p. 442 (internal citations omitted). 
C. The Rule 35 Motion and the Court's Denial of the Motion 
Ms. Halbesleben filed a I.C.R. r~ile 35 motion requesting that her 
sentence be reduced for various reasons which will be described in detail below. 
First, the motion asserted that while the court was not bound by the plea 
agreement, compelling reasons exist to follow it. (R. p. 119.) The plea 
agreement provided value for everyone involved, by pleading guilty, her children 
did not have to testify against her, and also saved the time and expense of a 
lengthy trial. (R. p. 119-120.) 
Second, practical case management concerns support a sentence in 
which Ms. Halbesleben received the benefit of her plea bargain. (R. p. 120.) The 
veteran prosecutor, after presumably considering the same factors as the court 
did, negotiated a plea agreement containing a recommended sentence reflecting 
the perceived value of the case. (R. p. 120.) Furthermore, while the parties 
understood that the court is not bound by a plea agreement, they nevertheless 
expect that the sentence will be somewhere in the ballpark of the negotiated 
plea agreement, and since it was not here, this case will be used as a benchmark 
by counsel when advising clients whether or not to accept a negotiated plea 
resolution. (R. p. 121 .) 
Furthermore, the motion argued that the case presents differently than 
other cases because the co-defendant did receive the benefit of his plea bargain. 
Mr. Halbesleben deserved the 15 year fixed sentence that he received because 
he had a prior felony conviction (of a similar nature) and also sexually molested 
his oldest daughter. (R. p. 121.) While the court followed the plea agreement in 
his case, it did not with Ms. Halbesleben, although she had essentially no prior 
record, no allegations that she sexually abused her children and was not more or 
less culpable than her husband for failing to protect the children. (R. p. 121-122.) 
The motion requested that the court reconsider the sentence for these reasons. 
(R. p. 122.) 
The motion also argued that the recognized sentencing factors support the 
imposition of the plea resolution. First, society is protected from Ms. Halbesleben 
since she physically can no longer have children, and conditions of release can 
insure that she not live with or care for any minor child. (R. p 122.) Outside of 
the facts of the case, society needs no protection from her since she has a 
minimal record and a work history and can (and will) work again. (R. p. 122-123.) 
Also, since it will be the parole commission who would have to be convinced that 
she is a good candidate for parole (and since it appears that fewer inmates are 
being paroled when first eligible according to defense counsel), the negotiated 
plea sentence provides for the protection of society. (R. p. 123.) 
As to deterrence, generally speaking, it is met by a sentence of up to 20 
years for failure to protect one's children. (R. p. 124.) As to specific deterrence, 
the negotiated prison term would be sufficient, and further fixed time would not 
likely add to it. (R. p. 123.) Also, since she cannot have additional children nor 
have her children returned to her, there is no further need to deter her from 
parenting again. (R, p. 123.) As to retribution, the state's opinion as to the 
retribution necessary was demonstrated by the negotiated plea agreement, and 
furthermore, two years was not necessarily the only punishment to be imposed, 
since Ms. Halbesleben was not guaranteed release after two years and even 
when released, would have to comply with the terms of her parole for the 
remainder of her sentence. (R. p. 124.) 
Finally as to rehabilitation, Ms. Halbesleben was married at age seventeen 
into a less than ideal environment. She was essentially a single mother whose 
husband committed unspeakable crimes against their oldest daughter, and while 
she did try to leave her husband she ultimately returned. (R. p. 124.) However, 
she appears to be intelligent and capable of working and giving back to society, 
and since she has divorced her husband and no longer has any parental rights, 
she should not face impediments in becoming a productive member of society. 
(R. p. 124-125.) 
Finally, the motion reiterated the parity in sentencing argument where the 
co-defendant did receive the benefit of his plea bargain. The motion stated that 
as counsel understands the proceedings, the co-defendant in the case 
negotiated a recommended sentence requiring that he serve 15 years fixed, and 
the state agreed to dismiss two counts of felony injury to a child and the Lewd 
and Lascivious Conduct charges filed against him. The same district judge 
followed the plea agreement and sentenced him to a minimum of 15 years fixed.4 
(R. p. 125.) Mr. Halbesleben had a previous conviction for Felony Injury to a 
Child, where he had injured one of his sons by putting a hole in his head. At the 
time of this incident Ms. Halbesleben was at work, and upon her return home, 
she examined the injury and took her son to a doctor. Therefore, the difference 
in negotiated resolutions makes sense since it reflected the fact that the husband 
had a prior conviction for felony injury to a child and was accused of sexually 
Thomas Halbesleben was sentenced to 15 years fixed followed by 15 years 
indeterminate. (Tr., 5/3/06, p. 27.) 
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abusing his oldest daughter. (R. p. 126.) 
Mr. Halbesleben was to (and did) receive a fixed sentence of fifteen years. 
Ms. Halbesleben contemplated receiving a sentence of 2 years fixed, but instead, 
received a sentence of 6 years fixed. Had the court tripled the recommendation 
of his fixed time as it did hers, he would have to serve 45 years before being 
eligible for parole. (R. p. 126.) 
The motion continued by pointing out that at sentencing, the Court 
explained that as a mother, Ms. Halbesleben had a greater duty to protect her 
children that perhaps a father.5 (R. p. 126.) The motion continued by stating 
that it must be remembered that Ms. Halbesleben was not much more than a 
child bride herself, having been married at 17, and due to her youth, lacked much 
of the life experience necessary to raise a family and/or to deal with her husband. 
(R. p. 126-127.) She went from living at home to being a wife to being a parent 
in short order, and until her incarceration, she had never known life without the 
influence and control of her husband. (R. p. 126.) The motion states that "[tlhere 
can be little doubt that Mr. Halbesleben got what he wanted when he wanted 
without any of the obligation." Rule 35 motion at p. 10. (R. p. 127.) However, the 
motion specifically did not elaborate since the same district judge also sentenced 
Mr. Halbesleben and so was familiar with him. (R. p. 127.) 
Other facts and factors that helped shape the plea agreement included the 
situation in 1995 when the children were removed from the home, and while in 
Actually, the court pointed out that historically, mothers in particular have 
incredible protective instincts when it comes to their children. (Tr. 5/3/06, p. 29.) 
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the custody of the Department of Health and Welfare and in foster care, the 
oldest boy was sexually molested. Ms. Halbesleben successfully completed the 
case plan and the boys were returned home, but the molestation reared its ugly 
head again in 2005, and Ms. Halbesleben told the police that her two older boys 
were molesting the younger children. (R. p. 127.) 
The motion requested that the court either reduce her sentence to that 
recommended by the state, 2 years fixed followed by 18 years indeterminate, or 
in the alternative, to amend the sentence imposed to run the fixed portion of her 
sentence, 3 years, concurrent rather than consecutive. (R. p. 128.) 
The district court denied the motion in a memorandum decision, the 
relevant portions of which follow: 
The defendant expends a great deal of time focusing upon the 
importance of plea agreements in the criminal justice process. The 
court has the responsibility for sentencing of a defendant and not 
the attorneys in the case. The role of the court is to independently 
analyze the factors set forth under Idaho Code $j 19-2604 and to 
base its decision upon those factors. Certainlv the Court can 
consider the plea negotiations and many times the Court will do so 
in reaching a decision as to the appropriate sentence. In this case, 
based upon the horrific conditions that multiple children were 
placed in as a direct result of the Defendant's actions, the plea 
aqreement was inapprooriate based upon the Court's review of the 
facts. 
The defendant argues that one defendant received the benefit of a 
plea negotiation and the other did not. Each case is evaluated on 
an individual basis and such an arqument is not only irrelevant, it is 
disinaenuous. The Court, in sentencing the defendant in this case, 
took into consideration the nature of the crime. The defendant, as 
a mother, allowed her teen-age children to molest a three year old 
child and a four year old child over a period of time on repeated 
occasions. She did nothing to stop this conduct, she was aware of 
this conduct and she allowed this despicable conduct to continue 
for months. These children will be forever scarred as a result of 
this inaction on the part of the Defendant. The defendant further 
directly, and certainly indirectly, created a situation where these 
children were isolated and therefore agencies of the city, county 
and state were denied an opportunity to step in and protect these 
children. 
In sentencing the defendant then, the Court took into consideration 
the nature of the crimes and the horrific impact this will have upon 
both the children who were molested, as well as the impact of the 
Defendant's actions has had on the children who were doing the 
molesting, in essence, a double affect upon children's lives. 
Further, the Court looked to general deterrence and specific 
deterrence in this case. This defendant has been involved in and 
around abuse and neglect of her children even prior to this incident, 
yet she continued this conduct. Clearly, society needs to know the 
kind of awful conditions that these children were living in and the 
ultimate permanent substantial emotional scarring that these 
children will bear for the rest of their lives, that significant 
punishment was merited under these circumstances. 
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 - Case No. H0500603, p. 2-4 (emphasis added). (R. p. 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Running the Sentences 
Consecutivelv andlor Bv Failina to Reduce the Sentence Upon Reauest 
Appellant will discuss the second issue first, to wit, that the district court 
erred in denying the Rule 35 motion. In short, Appellant is not simply asserting 
that the court should have granted leniency. Rather, Appellant asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the motion because it did not 
understand the correct legal standards involved, and thus abused its discretion. 
The court did this in two ways. First, its comments in dehying the Rule 35 motion 
show that it did not understand that correct legal standards that it should have 
used at the change of plea hearing and at the sentencing. However, Appellant 
will discuss these errors in terms of the Rule 35 motion because that is were the 
court discusses them. Appellant secondly asserts that instead of using the Rule 
35 motion to explain what it earlier did (improperly), the court should have used it 
as a vehicle to correct those errors. 
First and foremost, while Appellant fully understands that the sentence 
recommendation contained in the plea bargain was not binding on the court, the 
court nevertheless apparently misunderstands the role that plea bargains play in 
the criminal justice system. The ldaho Court of Appeals recently described the 
importance in Schoger v. Sfafe, - Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2008WL3905424 
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the 
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea 
bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of 
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. ldaho 
recognizes guilty pleas obtained through the plea bargaining 
process and sets forth the requirements and procedures relating to 
such pleas in Rule 11. Among those requirements, a court must 
ensure that all guilty pleas are made knowingly and voluntarily so 
as to not violate the defendant's constitutional right against being 
compelled or coerced to bear witness against himself or herself in a 
criminal case. 
Id., 2008 WL 3905424 , p. 6 (internal citations omitted). 
In sharp contrast to plea bargains being considered to be an essential 
component and encouraged, the district court in our case stated that the court 
can consider them and "many times" the court will do so. Appellant suggests 
that the essential nature of plea bargains requires more than a possibility that the 
court consider them.6 
Further, the court said that in this case, the plea agreement was 
inappropriate based upon the court's review of the facts. However, this is a case 
where the court actually knew quite a deal about the facts before the change of 
plea hearing. The defense had brought a motion to dismiss the indictment, and 
so the evidence presented to the grand jury was detailed to the court, as is clear 
from its ruling on the motion. (R. p. 81-82.) Appellant asserts that since the 
court already knew the facts before it was presented with the plea bargain, it 
should not have accepted the guilty pleas if it knew that the plea agreement was 
inappropriate. 
In short, the defendant was led down the garden path by being advised 
only that the court was not bound by the sentence recommendation, when in fact, 
the court did not even believe that it must consider the recommendation, and 
also, the court already knew the facts which it later stated made the plea 
agreement inappropriate. 
Thus, since the I.C.R. 35 motion was grounded in part by a request that 
the plea agreement be honored, instead of denying it, the court should have 
reduced the sentence to alleviate the problems caused by the court itself. 
In this case the court advised the defendant only that it was "not necessarily 
bound by the sentence negotiations." (Tr. 11/4/05, p. 2, In. 3.) Thus, Appellant 
alternatively asserts that the plea was not knowingly or intelligently made since 
while she knew that the court did not have to follow the recommendation, she 
was unaware that the court may not even consider it. 
Another problem occurs with the court's ruling regarding the defendant's 
argument that one defendant received the benefit of a plea negotiation and the 
other did not. The court ruled that each case is evaluated on an individual basis 
and not only is such an argument irrelevant, but disingenuous. While it is 
unclear to Appellant just exactly what the court meant by this, Appellant asserts 
that any interpretation of it is contrary to the relevant legal standards. 
While the disparity of sentences (or lack thereof) between co-defendants 
may not render a sentence per se unreasonable, the sentence of a co- 
defendant in the same case is of course relevant, and arguing that it is so is 
certainly not d i~ in~enuous .~  Appellant asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by what appears to be its categorical refusal to consider the co- 
defendant's sentence while evaluating the proper sentence for Ms. 
Halbesleben. 
Finally, Appellant argues that the sentence was unreasonably harsh when 
imposed (and so also should have been reduced pursuant to the Rule 35 motion) 
because the court ran the sentences consecutive to each other. Sfate v. 
Amerson, 129 ldaho 395,406, 925 P.2d 399,410 (Ct.App. 1996), shows that the 
structuring of multiple sentences can result in an unreasonably harsh total 
sentence, even if the individual sentences themselves are not. 
Amerson followed Stafe v. Alberts, 121 ldaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct.App. 
' Significantly, in Sfafe v. Izaguirre, 145 ldaho 820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct.App. 
2008), the ldaho Court of Appeals reviewed at length the sentences of similar 
crimes in published decisions which were not even connected to that case. Id., 
186 P.3d p. 680. 
1992), in reducing a sentence by ordering consecutive sentences to instead run 
concurrent. In Alberfs, the Court of Appeals provided a valuable review of other 
cases in which the ldaho Supreme Court had modified sentences from running 
consecutively to concurrent: 
In the Dunnagan case, two defendants, who were 20 and 21 years 
of age respectively, and who had "very low IQ's", each received 
eleven sentences for a series of grand larceny and burglary 
convictions. Their sentences essentially amounted to an initial 
period of fourteen years followed by another, consecutive sentence 
of fourteen years, for a total of twenty-eight years. Although the 
Supreme Court recognized the discretionary authority of the trial 
court to impose sentences within the maximum limits set by statute, 
and also to require that the sentences be served consecutively, the 
Court ordered a modification of the sentences. The Court said: 
One of the objects of our system of criminal justice is 
rehabilitation. Either or both of these unfortunate 
young men should be able to benefit, if at all, from 
what rehabilitative programs are available, within a 
fourteen year period. Under these circumstances, to 
impose a sentence which was more than double [sic] 
the length of their current natural lives was excessive 
and unduly harsh. Accordingly, it is the court's 
decision that the two fourteen-year sentences should 
run concurrently, and we remand with instructions to 
the district court to amend its order of commitment so 
as to cause the sentences to so run. 
101 ldaho at 126, 609 P.2d at 658. 
In Drapeau, the Court modified a sentence for attempt to commit 
infamous crime against nature by ordering that it be served 
concurrently -- rather than consecutively as specified by the trial 
court -- with a sentence for assault with intent to commit infamous 
crime, because the two crimes "arose out of the same act." 97 
ldaho at 693, 551 P.2d at 980. In Monroe, the defendant had pled 
guilty to three counts of forgery. After accepting the guilty plea, the 
district court sentenced Monroe to fourteen years upon each count 
and ordered that the terms be served consecutively rather than 
concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
conviction but ordered modification of the sentence. The Court said: 
We believe that under the circumstances of this case 
in which the forged checks were all obtained as part 
of a common plan or scheme and cashed as part of 
that common plan or scheme and in which the 
aggregate amount of the forged checks was only $ 
50.00, the imposition of three consecutive fourteen 
year sentences was unduly harsh and an abuse of 
discretion. The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but 
the sentence imposed is ordered modified to provide 
that the three fourteen year sentences run 
concurrently. 
97 ldaho at 457, 546 P.2d at 854. Finally, in Ross, the Court 
modified the sentences imposed for lewd conduct with a minor. 
Ross had been found guilty by a jury on three charges of sexually 
molesting two girls, ages five and six. The district court imposed 
sentences of ten years on each count and ordered that the 
sentences be served consecutively. The Supreme Court modified 
the sentences, on appeal, explaining: 
The court, by its judgment of conviction, sentenced 
appellant to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed 
10 years on each of the three counts. I.C. 3 18-308 . . 
. would require these sentences to run consecutively; 
and the judgment does not provide that they run 
concurrently. Under all of the circumstances of this 
case it is the consensus of this court that a total 
indeterminate sentence of 30 years of penal servitude 
is unduly harsh and that the sentences on each of the 
three counts should run concurrently. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the 
sentence structure thereof is ordered modified to 
provide that the sentences of 10 years penal 
servitude on each of the three counts 
run concurrently. 
92 ldaho at 718,449 P.2d at 378 (citation omitted) 
Alberfs at p. 207-208. 
Also following Amerson, supra, in Sfafe v. Castro, 131 ldaho 274, 954 
P.2d 692 (Ct.App. 1998), the ldaho Court of Appeals reduced the defendant's 
sentence from two 14 year fixed sentences running consecutive, to shorter 
sentences running concurrent (14 years with the first 10 years fixed concurrent to 
a 10 year fixed sentence): 
According to the PSI report, Castro, at the time of sentencing, was 
twenty-one years old and affiliated with a gang. Admittedly, Castro's 
short life has, thus far, consisted of extensive criminal activity. At 
age nine, Castro was adjudicated for theft in Oregon. Since that 
first offense, Castro has committed numerous crimes, spanning 
from Oregon to Idaho. 
In addition, Castro conducted himself in an abhorrent manner while 
incarcerated and awaiting the district court's sentence in this case. 
The district court, aware of this information, imposed the maximum 
sentence on both counts, fourteen years for grand theft and ten 
years for burglary, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively 
for a total of twenty-four years fixed. The district court stated that 
Castro is either an "individual who has gone through some 
experiences that have created severe . . . emotional and 
psychological instability, or that [he is] an individual who doesn't 
care, and in fact enjoys crime--enjoys hurting people. I don't know 
which one it is." 
In light of his criminal record, we agree that society needs 
protection from Castro until such time that parole authorities may 
determine him suitable for an intensively supervised release. 
However, twenty-four years fixed is excessive and unreasonable, 
defeating any hope of rehabilitation while within the prison system. 
Castro is twenty-one years old and is being sentenced for crimes 
arising out of a single incident. The sentences, as imposed, would 
require Castro to spend a large portion of his adult life in prison 
without any opportunity or encouragement to prove that the 
decisions he made in his early adult life were youthful mistakes and 
that he can effectuate a change in his attitude, modifying his 
criminal behavior. Although Castro has committed serious crimes, 
we conclude that he should not be required to serve the maximum 
possible sentence in each case consecutively without being given 
any chance to prove that he is suitable for a parole-supervised 
release. 
In our case, Ms. Halbesleben did not have an extensive criminal history 
(basically none), nor did she behave abhorrently while incarcerated. While 
multiple charges were of course involved, the underlying conduct was the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Halbesleben respectfully requests that this Court allow her to 
withdraw her- guilty pleas, or in the alternative, requests that this Court vacate her 
sentence and remand this matter for resentencing before a different judge, or as 
a further alterative, Ms. Halbesleben requests that this court reduce her 
sentence to one that is reasonable by restructuring the fixed terms of her 
sentences by running them concurrent. 
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